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This paper analyzes the relationship between bilateral trade ﬂows, trade openness,
and asset holdings in a three-country stochastic general equilibrium model. The three-
country model set-up enables me to disentangle and separate the eﬀects bilateral trade
ﬂows and trade openness have on bilateral portfolio patterns. I ﬁnd that both factors
independently inﬂuence bilateral asset holdings. Higher bilateral trade as well as higher
trade openness lead to a higher bilateral foreign asset position. Furthermore, the
two factors show an interaction eﬀect, where increasing trade openness diminishes the
inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows on asset holdings. I provide supporting empirical
evidence for these theoretical ﬁndings using a data set on the geographical composition
of international portfolio holdings.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F10, F30, F41
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1. Introduction
In recent years, cross-border asset holdings have risen strongly. But despite increasing international
ﬁnancial integration, equity and bond holdings still diﬀer widely across countries. This stands in
contrast to economic theory which predicts that in a fully integrated frictionless world cross-border
portfolios should be identical across countries,1 leading to the question which factors determine the
size and geographical composition of these varying portfolios. The factors can be grouped along two
lines, size of foreign asset position and geographical composition, and have been studied extensively
in the literature. The size of the foreign asset position is determined, inter alia, by trade openness.
Countries that are more open to trade, measured as total exports plus imports, hold larger foreign
asset positions (see, e.g., Lane, 2000; Heathcote and Perri, 2009; Aizenman and Noy, 2009).2 On
∗I thank Benjamin Born, Michael Evers, Gernot Müller, Johannes Pfeifer, Sergejs Saksonovs, Jürgen von Hagen and
participants at the Bonn Macro Workshop and the ZEI Summer School 2009 for helpful comments. All remaining
errors are my own. Please address correspondence to alexandra.peter@uni-bonn.de, Bonn Graduate School of
Economics, University of Bonn, Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany.
1See, e.g., Lucas (1982).
2Other factors that inﬂuence the aggregate foreign asset position are economic size and ﬁnancial development (see
Lane, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004; Heathcote and Perri, 2009).
1the other hand, bilateral trade is one of the factors that govern the geographical composition of the
foreign asset position.3 Both Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007)
report that bilateral trade ﬂows have a positive impact on bilateral asset holdings. However, these
studies have either focused solely on trade openness and the size of foreign asset positions or on
bilateral trade patterns and the composition of foreign asset positions, but have not looked at the
combination of both.
In this paper, I take up this issue and analyze the relationship between bilateral trade, trade
openness and asset holdings theoretically, using a three-country model, as well as empirically,
providing evidence for the inﬂuence of both bilateral trade and trade openness on bilateral asset
holdings. To study the eﬀects of trade openness and bilateral trade ﬂows in a uniﬁed framework,
I build a three-country/three-good general equilibrium model consisting of simple endowment
economies with home bias in consumption due to households preferring the home good over foreign
goods.4 The switch to a three-country model is crucial as bilateral trade ﬂows and openness are
inseparably intertwined in the two-country case. Higher openness can only be achieved by higher
bilateral trade as there are no other trading partners. Conversely, increasing the bilateral trade
between the two countries inevitably raises their trade openness. Hence, it is impossible to analyze
the individual eﬀects of bilateral and total trade on the foreign portfolio share. This has the
consequence that in a two-country set-up the focus has to be either on the eﬀect of trade openness
or the eﬀect of bilateral trade. In contrast, with three countries both eﬀects can be studied in a
uniﬁed framework. I can vary bilateral trade ﬂows while holding the openness of a country constant.
That way it is possible to distinguish explicitly between the inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows and
the inﬂuence of openness on the geographical composition of the foreign asset position. In addition,
I can identify possible interaction eﬀects between bilateral trade and trade openness.
In order to keep the theoretical model simple and tractable, I follow Lucas (1982), Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2001), Kollmann (2006), and Heathcote and Perri (2009) in assuming complete ﬁnancial
markets and full risk-sharing. That way it is possible to ﬁrst characterize the optimal social
planner consumption allocation and then identify the asset allocation that replicates this optimal
consumption allocation in a decentralized setting, where only a restricted set of assets is available.
First, my results show that bilateral trade and trade openness both have independent eﬀects on
bilateral asset holdings. Holding either one constant, while varying the other one, gives a distinct
pattern for the bilateral foreign asset position. The sign of the eﬀect of bilateral trade ﬂows, but
also of trade openness, depends on the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. The
elasticity of substitution in combination with the trade pattern drives the responses of international
relative prices to endowment shocks and, through this, determines the portfolio allocation. For
relatively small values of the elasticity of substitution, higher trade ﬂows between two countries
lead, ceteris paribus, to higher asset holdings between these two countries. For higher values of the
elasticity of substitution, the opposite pattern emerges: higher trade ﬂows lead to smaller asset
holdings of the trade partner’s stock. Kollmann (2006) also found the importance of the elasticity
3Other factors are, e.g., informational and cultural linkages.
4Home bias in consumption is commonly used in the vast literature analyzing portfolio home bias. Consumption
home bias is either introduced through preferences (see, e.g., Kollmann, 2006; Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin,
2007) or through trade costs (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2001; Coeurdacier, 2009).
2of substitution in his two-country model. But in using a three-country set-up, I am able to show
that bilateral trade ﬂows have an independent eﬀect even when holding openness constant.
Second, my results indicate that, ceteris paribus, bilateral investment positions are larger for
higher degrees of openness. In this case, stronger terms-of-trade reactions in response to endowment
shocks lead to higher asset holdings through the eﬀects the terms-of-trade have on consumption
expenditures. This particular feature of the model emerges for parameter constellations where
home and foreign goods are complements.
Third, I ﬁnd a small interaction eﬀect between bilateral trade and openness. Comparing the
inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows on asset holdings for diﬀerent values of openness shows that the
eﬀect of bilateral trade ﬂows on equity holdings is smaller for higher trade openness. Intuitively,
equity shares of the trading partner are less important for risk sharing if there is a lot of trade with
other countries.
Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence that both bilateral trade ﬂows as well as total trade
ﬂows inﬂuence bilateral asset holdings positively and signiﬁcantly. For this purpose, I employ a
gravity model to estimate the inﬂuence of bilateral trade and trade openness on bilateral asset
holdings.5 The basis for this analysis is the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which provides the geographical composition of security
investments of up to 74 source countries.6 I include both bilateral and total trade ﬂows in my
analysis of bilateral investment patterns. While bilateral trade ﬂows have been found to be a
major determinant of bilateral cross-border asset holdings,7 total trade ﬂows as a measure for trade
openness have only been used to explain aggregate foreign asset positions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the three-country stochastic
general equilibrium model and its solution. In section 3, the resulting optimal portfolios for diﬀering
trade patterns are analyzed. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis of bilateral asset holdings,
while section 5 concludes.
2. A Three-Country Model
2.1. Model Set-Up
I use a two-period variant of the model by Kollmann (2006) and extend it to a three-country set-up.
The three countries are indexed by i = 1,2,3 and each is exogenously endowed with a distinct
national good, Yi. The economies are linked internationally by trade in goods and equities and
exist for two periods (t = 0,1).8 In the ﬁrst period (t = 0), only equity shares, which are claims
to the future endowment of a particular country, are traded. In period t = 1, the endowment
process is realized and the representative household trades goods, settles the equity claims, and
5Gravity models are traditionally used in the international trade literature, but are now also widely used to explain
international investment patterns of equity holdings (e.g., Portes and Rey, 2005; Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007;
Sarisoy Guerin, 2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), bank lending (e.g., Rose and Spiegel, 2004) and foreign
direct investment (FDI) (e.g., Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2002).
6Source country residents hold security investments, which are issued by destination country residents, and report
these holdings in the CPIS.
7See Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
8Variables without a time subscript correspond to period t = 1.
3consumes. The only source of uncertainty in this model is the stochastic endowment process. I
assume E0[Yi] = 1, for i = 1,2,3, where E0 is the conditional expectation operator given information
at date t = 0.
2.1.1. Preferences






, ρ > 0, (1)























θ−1 for i = 1,2,3  (2)
Here, ci
j denotes consumption in country i of good j and αi
j is the corresponding weight parameter
for that particular good. Note that
 3
j=1 αi
j = 1 and a preference for the home good in country i
that is 1
3 < αi
i ≤ 1 corresponds to consumption home bias in country i. The elasticity of substitution
between any two goods is θ.9
Introducing pj as the price of good j and normalizing p1 to unity, the consumption based price








1−θ for i = 1,2,3  (3)
Since p1 is normalized to unity, the prices p2 and p3 can be interpreted as the terms-of-trade of
country 1 vis-à-vis countries 2 and 3, respectively. The real-exchange rate between country i and j,
RERij =
Pj
Pi, is the price of country j consumption relative to country i consumption.
2.1.2. Financial Markets
There is international trade in equity shares, Si
j, which are claims of country i to a fraction of the
future endowment of country j. Each share of stock j entitles the owner to a dividend payment.
The size of this payment is determined by the value of country j’s endowment, pjYj.





j = 1 for j = 1,2,3  (4)
At the beginning of period 0, country i has zero foreign assets, Si
j,0 = 0 (i  = j), and holds all
local shares, Si
i,0 = 1. With qj,0 being the price of stock j in period 0, the budget constraint of




3 = qi,0 for i = 1,2,3  (5)
9Assuming θ = 1, aggregate consumption is of Cobb-Douglas type and α
i
j represents the expenditure share spent for
consumption of good j in country i.





In period 1, after uncertainty has been realized and dividends have been distributed, the represen-
tative household in country i decides on consumption, ci
j, taking as given his portfolio of equity







3p3Y3 for i = 1,2,3, (6)
i.e., consumption expenditures equal portfolio income. Maximizing the utility of country i’s
representative household, equation (1), subject to the budget constraint for period 1 yields the





































where λi is the Lagrange multiplier on the period 1 budget constraint of country i. After character-
izing how the household income is optimally allocated across consumption goods, the next step is
to explore the income side, i.e., the equity portfolio allocation.
In period 0, no production or consumption takes place, but the representative household decides
on the amount of equity shares he wants to hold. When deciding on the asset portfolio the agent
takes into account his consumption plan for period 1 and that his ﬁnancial income is uncertain. Let
λi
0 be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of period 0 in country i. The representative
agent of country i maximizes his utility, equation (1), subject to the budget constraints for periods























































These equations show that the demand for equity shares depends on the purchase price in period 0
and the asset return in period 1.
52.1.4. Equilibrium in the decentralized economy
Having characterized the set-up of the economy and the household maximization, the next step
is to deﬁne the equilibrium in the decentralized economy. The equilibrium in the decentralized






3, i = 1,2,3, and prices p2, p3, q1,0, q2,0,
q3,0, such that
1. the FOCs for consumption, equations (7)-(9),
2. the FOCs for equity shares, equations (10)-(12), and
3. the budget constraint, equation (6), hold and
4. asset markets, equation (4), and goods markets, c1
j + c2
j + c3
j = Yj, j = 1,2,3, clear.
2.2. Equilibrium with full risk-sharing
As in Lucas (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001), Kollmann (2006) and Heathcote and Perri (2009),
I focus on equilibria with full risk-sharing, i.e., Pareto eﬃcient equilibria. Therefore, I ﬁrst solve
the central planner’s problem to obtain the eﬃcient consumption allocation. In a next step, I
characterize the asset portfolio in a decentralized economy that supports the eﬃcient consumption
allocation. In the decentralized economy, the number of assets is restricted to three equities.
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) show that such a portfolio can replicate the full risk-sharing
allocation up to ﬁrst order, if the number of shocks equals the number of assets and the asset pay-oﬀs
react to shocks. While the ﬁrst condition is fulﬁlled in my model with three endowment shocks and
three assets, I will later encounter some model calibrations for which the second condition is not
fulﬁlled.
2.2.1. Eﬃcient Consumption Allocation
The eﬃcient allocation is attained through a social planner maximizing the sum of the countries’
















C3 1−ρ − 1
1 − ρ
(13)




j = Yj for j = 1,2,3, (14)
and C1,C2,C3 given by equation (2).

















































6These conditions imply that the marginal utilities from consuming good j are perfectly positively
correlated across countries. From these risk-sharing conditions and the resource constraints, I can
compute the eﬃcient consumption allocation, ci
1, ci
2, ci
3, for i = 1,2,3.
Before decentralizing the eﬃcient consumption allocation, let us look at the properties of the
consumption allocation and, in particular, its response to endowment shocks. For this purpose,
it is convenient to deﬁne  i
j ≡ ci
j/Yj as the eﬃcient share of good j that is consumed by the
representative agent of country i. The response of this eﬃcient consumption share to an endowment
shock shows whether consumption changes proportionally to an endowment shock or not. The





ρ = θ, the utility function is additively separable in the three goods. The risk-sharing conditions
then imply that marginal utilities of good j are perfectly correlated across all countries, if consump-
tion of good j changes by the same amount in all countries. Linearizing the risk-sharing conditions
shows this: ˆ c1
j = ˆ c2
j and ˆ c1
j = ˆ c3
j (see Appendix A). Eﬃcient risk-sharing thus prescribes, that,
after an increase of the endowment of good j, consumption of good j increases proportional to the
endowment shock in all three countries. Consumption of the other two goods remains unchanged




ρ  = θ, the response of consumption shares depends on the relation 1
ρ ≶ θ, which determines
whether the goods are complements or substitutes (see Kollmann, 2006).
Assume 1
ρ > θ. In this parameter region the three goods are complements, as a higher consumption
of one good increases the marginal utilities of the other goods. Full risk-sharing prescribes that
marginal utilities should equalize across countries after a shock. However, if, after a positive
endowment shock to good 1, agents in all countries increase consumption of good 1 proportional to
the endowment shock and leave consumption of the other two goods unchanged, marginal utilities
from consuming any good do not equalize. Marginal utility from consuming good 1 falls less in
country 1 than in country 2 or 3 because marginal utility increases with aggregate consumption.
Aggregate consumption in turn rises more in country 1 than in the other ones. On the other hand,
marginal utility from consuming good 2 or 3 increases more in country 1 than in the other two
countries. Hence, for marginal utilities to equalize, consumption of good 1 in country 1 has to
rise more than the endowment shock, while consumption of good 1 in the other countries has to
rise less than the endowment shock. Furthermore, consumption of goods 2 and 3 must increase in
country 1, while it falls in country 2 and 3.
To summarize, consumption shares of a country increase for a positive endowment shock in the
same country, while they fall for a positive endowment shock in one of the other countries. Due to
10In a dynamic model the risk aversion parameter, ρ, is related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, in
the following way: σ =
1
ρ. However, in this model consumption takes place only in period 1.
7complementarities and home bias, the country experiencing the positive endowment shock has to
consume proportionally more of all goods.
For 1
ρ < θ, consumption shares react the opposite way. A country’s consumption shares fall for a
positive endowment shock to its own good, while they increase for an endowment shock to one of
the other goods.
Note the important role of home bias. Without the assumption of home bias in consumption,
but with identical preferences for all three goods, consumption shares would be constant no matter
what the relationship between 1
ρ and θ is.
2.2.2. Decentralizing the Eﬃcient Allocation
Having computed the eﬃcient consumption allocation from the social planner solution, I can now
identify the portfolio allocation that supports this eﬃcient consumption allocation. To this end, I
have to ﬁnd a set of prices and portfolios, p2, p3, Si
1, Si
2, Si




3, for i = 1,2,3, constitutes an equilibrium.
Substituting the eﬃcient consumption allocation into the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption,



























for i = 1,2,3  (18)
The next step is to ﬁnd the portfolio allocation, Si
1, Si
2, Si
3, for i = 1,2,3, that supports the
eﬃcient allocation. Since the budget constraint for each country has to hold for the portfolio
allocation, I can use these constraints to compute the optimal equity shares. However, to ﬁnd this
portfolio, I have to resort to a linear approximation since the ﬁrst order conditions are nonlinear.
This is done in the next section.
2.3. Linear Approximation
The model equations are linearized around a symmetric equilibrium where endowments and prices
are equal and trade is balanced. Here, ˆ x = x−¯ x
¯ x denotes percentage deviations from the symmetric
equilibrium, ¯ x.
Linearizing the period 1 budget constraint for country 1, equation (6), and using the deﬁnition




1 + ˆ Y1) + ¯  1
2(ˆ  1
2 + ˆ p2 + ˆ Y2) + ¯  1
3(ˆ  1
3 + ˆ p3 + ˆ Y3) = S1
1 ˆ Y1 + S1
2(ˆ p2 + ˆ Y2) + S1
3(ˆ p3 + ˆ Y3)  (19)
This expression shows that the change in total consumption expenditures in response to an




1 + ¯  1
2ˆ  1
2 + ¯  1
3ˆ  1
3 = (S1
1 − ¯  1
1)ˆ Y1 + (S1
2 − ¯  1
2)(ˆ p2 + ˆ Y2) + (S1
3 − ¯  1
3)(ˆ p3 + ˆ Y3)  (20)
On the left hand side, I have isolated the change in consumption expenditures in response to an
endowment shock that is due to changes of consumption shares. These are changes of the eﬃcient
consumption allocation that are not proportional to an endowment shock. The right hand side
shows the change in total expenditures that is due to changes of relative prices and it shows the
change in portfolio income. In order to analyze the implications of relative price and consumption
share responses (discussed above) for the portfolio allocation, next I examine how endowment
shocks aﬀect relative prices.
The terms-of-trade of country 1 correspond to the relative prices p2 and p3. Linearizing equations
(17) and (18) and again using the deﬁnition for consumption shares yields:





2 + ˆ Y2 − ˆ  i
1 − ˆ Y1
 
, (21)





3 + ˆ Y3 − ˆ  i
1 − ˆ Y1
 
for i = 1,2,3  (22)
With the assumption of eﬃcient risk-sharing, the terms-of-trade of country 1 always fall in response
to a positive home endowment shock (see Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc, 2008). The terms-of-trade of
country 2 and country 3 behave in the same way and fall in response to a positive endowment shock
to good 2 and good 3, respectively. Equations (21) and (22) further show that the terms-of-trade
between two countries can also change in response to an endowment shock in the third country.
For example, assume a higher endowment in country 3, ˆ Y3 > 0, while ˆ Y1 = ˆ Y2 = 0. If consumption
shares of good 1 and good 2 do not respond in an identical way to this endowment shock, i.e.,
ˆ  i
1  = ˆ  i
2, the terms-of-trade between country 1 and 2 change, ˆ p2  = 0.
2.4. Equity Portfolios
In a next step, I solve for equity shares, that replicate the eﬃcient consumption allocation. That
means, I compute the portfolio of country 1, S1
1, S1
2, S1
3, such that its budget constraint, equation



























































1 summarizes the response of consumption shares in country 1 to an endowment shock in
country i and Γi
pj shows the response of pj to an endowment shock in country i.11 The portfolios




pj, see appendix A.
9of the other countries can be derived in a similar manner.
However, there are two cases where it is not possible to derive equilibrium asset shares. In the
ﬁrst case, portfolio holdings are indeterminate. This case occurs for two parameter combinations.
If the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, θ = 1, and either the utility function is logarithmic,
ρ = 1, or preferences do not exhibit home bias, αi
j = 1/3, consumption shares are constant in
response to an endowment shock (∆i
1 = 0) and the terms-of-trade fully oﬀset endowment shocks
(Γ2
p2 = Γ3
p3 = −1, see appendix A). Thus, terms-of-trade changes fully insure against output
ﬂuctuations and ﬁnancial autarky is eﬃcient (see also Cole and Obstfeld, 1991).
In the second case, for some parameter combinations, the given asset structure cannot replicate





p3 = 0). The equity pay-oﬀs are not state-contingent and it is not possible to generate a
pay-oﬀ structure that replicates the one for Arrow-Debreu securities.
Apart from the two cases just discussed, equations (23)-(25) specify the equity portfolio of
country 1. The equity shares generate the ﬁnancial income for arbitrary realizations of endowment
shocks that induce the households to consume according to the eﬃcient consumption allocation.
Therefore, they incorporate the responses of consumption shares and relative prices to endowment
shocks, as these indicate how the eﬃcient consumption allocation and the dividends look like for
diﬀerent endowment realizations.
The ﬁrst term in S1
j indicates the level of asset holdings, if consumption shares are constant for
all endowment realizations. In this case, the asset share of stock j corresponds to the share agent 1
consumes of good j (at the point of linearization) which is equal to the preference weight for good
j. Thus, ﬁnancial income from these asset holdings suﬃces for consumption expenditures for good
j, because both endowment shock responses are the same. If, however, not only relative prices but
also consumption shares react to endowment shocks, equity shares have to be higher or lower than
the consumption weight. Higher asset holdings of a stock, whose dividend is higher relative to
the other stocks, would induce the representative agent of country 1 to consume a higher output
share as prescribed by eﬃcient risk-sharing. However, I cannot state general conclusions about
the consumption share and terms-of-trade responses and their co-movement, since they speciﬁcally
depend on the chosen parameters.
3. Results from a Calibrated Model
3.1. Calibration
My model is parsimonious in the number of parameters. The parameter for risk aversion is set
to ρ = 2, a standard value in the literature (see, e.g., Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1994). There
is no consensus on the value of the elasticity of substitution between home and imported goods,
θ, with estimates being highly dependent on the data used. Studies using disaggregated sectoral
data usually ﬁnd higher estimates of 3 − 6 (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; Hummels, 2001),
while studies using macro data ﬁnd lower estimates of 0 23 − 2. The estimates of Enders and
Müller (2009) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) are at the lower end with values of 0 23 and 0 3,
respectively, while Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) ﬁnd a value of 0 85 and Backus, Kehoe, and
10Kydland (1994) use one of 1 5. The parameter θ plays a key role for the division of the portfolio
between home and foreign assets. Therefore, I will ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium portfolios for a
given trade pattern and θ ∈ [0,5]. However, when analyzing the eﬀects of bilateral trade ﬂows, I
will set θ = 0 3. At this value of θ, the inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows on asset holdings best ﬁts
the empirical evidence presented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Aviat and Coeurdacier
(2007).
Since the main objective of this paper is to analyze the eﬀects of bilateral trade and openness, it
is natural to consider diﬀerent values for the consumption preference parameters that govern trade
ﬂows. The values of the αi
js are chosen to pin down the import share in country 1, α1
j + α1
k,j  = k,
at 30% of GDP. The exact speciﬁcations for all αi
js depend on the prespeciﬁed trade pattern and
will be given in subsequent sections.
3.2. The Portfolios’ Dependence on the Elasticity of Substitution
In this section, I analyze how the portfolio allocation depends on the substitution elasticity, θ,
given a speciﬁc trade pattern. I study the portfolio composition for two diﬀerent trade patterns. In
case 1, all countries have symmetric preferences, such that trade ﬂows between all countries are
identical (see table (1), case 1).
In the second case, country 1 and 2 have asymmetric preferences for the respective foreign goods,
but otherwise they are symmetric. I interpret country 3 as the rest of the world, such that the
import share from country 3 is higher than the one from the other trading partner. In other words,
the consumption preference parameters are set, such that α1
2 (α2
1) is smaller than α1
3 (α2
3). Table
(1) (case 2) gives the speciﬁcation for the consumption preference parameters. Note that country 3
has symmetric preferences for good 1 and 2, and that due to the assumption of overall and bilateral
balanced trade the import share of country 3 has to be reduced.
Table 1: Trade Flow Matrix
Case 1: Sym. Pref. Case 2: Asym. Pref.
Import Country i 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.7 0.15 0.15 0.7 0.1 0.2
Export Country j 2 0.15 0.7 0.15 0.1 0.7 0.2
3 0.15 0.15 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.6
Note: The table reports the share α
i
j that country i imports from export country j for symmetric and asymmetric
preferences regarding the two foreign goods.
3.2.1. Symmetric Preferences
For symmetric preferences, the portfolio allocation is identical in all three countries and I focus on
the portfolio allocation of country 1. Figure 1 shows the portfolio of country 1 as a function of the
elasticity of substitution, θ. Due to the symmetric preference structure, asset holdings of stocks 2
and 3 are identical. As mentioned, θ plays a key role for the composition of the portfolio. There
exists a critical value of θ, ˜ θs = 1 22, for which dividends are unaﬀected by endowment shocks
11and the eﬃcient consumption allocation cannot be supported under the existing asset structure.12
For values of θ smaller than this threshold, the portfolio of country 1 exhibits home bias, while
for values higher than ˜ θs the portfolio mainly contains foreign shares. For values of θ near the
threshold point, the portfolio exhibits extreme home or foreign bias. As noted by Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009), the portfolio responds very sensitively to preference parameter changes. A
small shift of θ can have huge eﬀects on the optimal asset holdings if close to the pole.
Households hold equity shares to hedge their consumption risk. The portfolio allocation can
therefore be explained through the abilities of diﬀerent stocks to hedge consumption risk. The
hedging ability of an equity is determined by the response of its dividend in comparison to the
response of consumption shares and relative to the dividend response of other stocks. As shown in
the last section, consumption shares in country 1 fall in response to a positive endowment shock to
good 2 or 3, if θ < 1/2 (since ρ = 2) and rise otherwise. An endowment shock to good j has two
eﬀects on the dividend of stock j, a volume eﬀect, through a higher or lower endowment, and a value
eﬀect, determined by the terms-of-trade response. The two eﬀects inﬂuence the dividend response
in opposite directions. At the critical value ˜ θs the two eﬀects fully oﬀset each other. For values of
θ smaller than ˜ θs, the value eﬀect prevails, since terms-of-trade move stronger if the substitution
elasticity is lower. In this case, the terms-of-trade and dividend response are positively correlated.
On the other hand, for θ > ˜ θs, the volume eﬀect dominates and a positive endowment shock leads to
a positive dividend reaction. Thus, terms-of-trade and dividend response are negatively correlated
for this parameter region.
Taken together the responses of consumption shares and dividends explain the portfolio allocation.
Assume a positive endowment shock to good 2. For θ < 1/2, consumption shares in country 1 fall.
At the same time, the dividend of stock 2 falls as well. Therefore, S1
2 has to be higher than α1
2 (see
equation (20)). However, the relative value of stock 1 is higher, therefore the home stock prevails
in the portfolio.
For 1/2 < θ < ˜ θs, consumption shares rise, while the dividend of stock 2 still falls. Thus, the
relative hedging ability of stock 2 is smaller than for the case discussed before and S1
2 is smaller
than α1
2. For values of θ near ˜ θs, country 1 even goes short in assets of country 2 and 3. The
dividend changes become smaller and to hedge consumption risk agents have to hold more and
more shares of the preferred stock. For full risk-sharing, country 1 would need to hold a larger
share of its own stock than it initially has in period 0. To ﬁnance this leveraged position it has
to go short in foreign assets, i.e., country 1 sells claims to the endowment of good 2 and 3. Since
country 1 does not own these claims in period 0, this is only possible if country 2 and 3 also want
to hold a leveraged position of their own stock and therefore go short in assets of country 1. In
period 1, after the endowment has been distributed, the following chain of events occurs: All three
countries hold a leveraged position of their own stock, i.e., more than 100%. But the distributed
endowment is only 100% of a country’s goods as it cannot violate the resource constraint. Country
1, in order to serve the claims it has shortened the period before, now buys the respective amounts
of endowment from countries 2 and 3 and then hands them back to them. Country 2 and 3 do the
same, making it possible to have a leveraged position of ones own stock.
12Baxter, Jermann, and King (1998) ﬁnd a similar eﬀect in a portfolio model with traded and nontraded goods for



















Figure 1: Equity Portfolio of Country 1 with Symmetric Preferences.
Note: The ﬁgure shows the shares country 1 holds of stock 1 (S
1
1, solid line) and of stock 2 (S
1
2, dashed





structure cannot replicate the eﬃcient consumption allocation for θ = ˜ θs = 1 22.
Once θ > ˜ θs, the dividend of stock 2 rises after an endowment shock in country 2 and holdings
of stock 2 can hedge consumption risk (consumption shares in country 1 are positively correlated
with an endowment shock to good 2) relatively better than holdings of stock 1. The portfolio now
contains a higher proportion of foreign shares than of home shares.
In summary, if consumption shares and the relative dividend value of the home asset co-move
positively, the portfolio exhibits home bias, while a negative co-movement leads to foreign bias.
These results are the same as in a standard two-country model (see Kollmann, 2006). Coeurdacier
(2009) also ﬁnds a foreign bias for a high substitution elasticity. In his model, the covariance
between the home real exchange rate and home equity returns matters for the composition of the
portfolio. A positive covariance leads to a home bias, while for a negative covariance the foreign
share in the portfolio prevails.
3.2.2. Asymmetric Preferences
Next, I interpret country 3 as the rest of the world and assume the trade pattern outlined in table
(1) for asymmetric preferences (case 2). Again I focus on the portfolio allocation of country 1.
Figure 2 displays the portfolio of country 1 as a function of θ. In comparison to the case with
symmetric preferences, asset holdings of stock 2 and 3 now diﬀer. Another diﬀerence relative to the
symmetric case is that for asset holdings of stock 1 and 2 there are now two values of θ where the
eﬃcient consumption allocation cannot be supported. However, the composition of the portfolio
has again a pole at θ = ˜ θa.13 For θ < ˜ θa, the portfolio contains mainly the local asset, while for
θ > ˜ θa foreign assets prevail.
In this setting, it is interesting to compare the two foreign shares, S1
2 and S1
3. When θ < ˜ θa,
asset holdings of stock 3 are higher than holdings of stock 2 except for values of θ that are close
13In what follows, I will focus for convenience on the portfolio where θ < ˜ θa1 = 1 10 and θ > ˜ θa2 = 1 28, denoting
the critical value of θ with ˜ θa. I make this assumption because the asset holdings between these two points show

























Figure 2: Equity Portfolio of Country 1 with Asymmetric Preferences.
Note: The ﬁgure shows the shares country 1 holds of stock 1 (S
1
1, solid line), of stock 2 (S
1
2, dashed line)
and of stock 3 (S
1
3, dotted line) as a function of the elasticity of substitution θ. The asset structure
cannot replicate the eﬃcient consumption allocation for θ = ˜ θa1 = 1 10 and θ = ˜ θa2 = 1 28.
to ˜ θa, while for θ > ˜ θa the opposite holds true. In the simple case where consumption shares are
constant, 1/ρ = θ, S1
3 is higher than S1
2 due to the fact that the representative household in country
1 prefers good 3 over good 2 (α1
3 > α1
2). Apart from this special case, diﬀerences in the responses
of consumption expenditures and relative prices, dependending on whether an endowment shock
aﬀects good 2 or 3, further contribute to S1
2  = S1
3. For the symmetric case, on the other hand, it
does not matter for consumption share and relative price responses whether the endowment shock
aﬀects good 2 or 3.
Trade ﬂows between country 1 and 3 are assumed to be higher than between country 1 and 2
(α1
3 = 0 2 > α1
2 = 0 1). Hence, these results show a (mostly) positive inﬂuence of bilateral trade
ﬂows on asset holdings for θ < ˜ θa, while for θ > ˜ θa the inﬂuence is negative. These results also
suggest that the inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows is closely related to the portfolio composition
regarding home and foreign assets.
3.3. How Bilateral Trade Flows aﬀect the Foreign Portfolio Share
One major advantage of the three country model developed in this paper is that it enables me to
analyze the eﬀects of bilateral trade ﬂows on asset holdings independently of trade openness. Let
us focus on country 1’s equity holdings of stock 2. An increase in the parameter α1
2 leads to a rise
in trade ﬂows between country 1 and 2. At the same time, the import share of country 1, α1
2 + α1
3,
stays constant due to the presence of country 3. Of course, trade ﬂows between country 1 and
country 3 decrease, when α1
2 increases.
I ﬁx the import share at 30% of output and assume that country 1 trades less with country 2
than with the rest of the world, i.e., α1
2 ∈ (0,0 15), where preferences are symmetric if α1
2 = 0 15.
Furthermore, the substitution elasticity, θ, is set to 0 3 as the results in section 3.2.2 imply a
relatively low value of θ to generate the empirically identiﬁed positive eﬀect of bilateral trade on
bilateral equity holdings (see the evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Aviat and Coeurdacier,
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Figure 3: Country 1 Holdings of Stock 2 for Increasing Trade Flows between Country 1 and 2.
Note: The ﬁgure shows S
1
2 for a bilateral import share α
1
2 between 0 and 0.15. The total import share
is 0.3 (solid line) and 0.4 (dashed line), such that α
1




3 = 0 4 − α
1
2, respectively. The
elasticity of substitution is set to θ = 0 3.
2007).14 Figure 3 displays the share of stock 2 in country 1’s portfolio as a function of α1
2 (solid
line). It shows that bilateral trade ﬂows have a positive eﬀect on asset holdings. Importantly, this
eﬀect is independent of the general openness to trade. When country 1 and 2 trade more with each
other, the ability of stock 2 to hedge consumption risk increases and country 1 holds more of stock
2.
Consider the following example of a negative endowment shock to good 2. The ﬁrst eﬀect is a
positive response of stock 2’s dividend through an terms-of-trade increase. In addition, consumption
expenditures rise due to the increases in terms-of-trade and consumption shares. On the one hand,
the increase in the dividend of stock 2 is stronger for higher imports from country 2 (α1
2 increases),
since the rise in the terms-of-trade is stronger in this case. This by itself would lead to lower asset
holdings. On the other hand, consumption expenditures react stronger to the endowment shock
if imports from country 2 are higher, thus calling for higher asset holdings of stock 2. Since the
latter eﬀect is more pronounced, shares of stock 2 are higher for higher α1
2 to generate the adequate
ﬁnancial income.
I am also interested in the eﬀect of trade openness on asset shares when controlling for the
eﬀect of bilateral trade ﬂows. To this end, I choose a higher import share of 40% and repeat the
experiment of computing the portfolio share of stock 2 as a function of α1
2. Figure 3 plots the
graphs for the two experiments. The solid line depicts holdings of stock 2 for an import share
of 30% and the dashed line shows holdings of stock 2 for an import share of 40%. Comparing
the asset holdings for the two import shares shows that openness exerts an independent eﬀect on
bilateral investment patterns. Although bilateral trade ﬂows are the same, bilateral asset holdings
vary with the degree of trade openness. The inﬂuence of openness is positive as country 1 holds
a higher share of stock 2 for an import share of 40% than for one of 30%. The explanation runs
along similar lines as for the eﬀect of α1
2 on S1
2. Consumption expenditures and the dividend of
14Note that a value of, e.g., θ = 0 8 would also generate a positive eﬀect of bilateral trade ﬂows on bilateral asset
holdings. However, foreign asset holdings are mainly negative in this case.
15stock 2 fall stronger in response to an endowment shock to good 2 if trade openness is higher. The
dividend of stock 2 falls stronger since the relative price of good 2 in terms of good 1 falls stronger
due to consumption of good 1 being higher. The stronger response of stock 2’s dividend would lead
the representative agent to hold a lower share of stock 2 regardless of the consumption expenditure
response. To generate a certain amount of ﬁnancial income, lower asset holdings are needed if their
value changes stronger. However, consumption expenditures also react stronger to an endowment
shock if trade openness is higher. This response calls for a higher ﬁnancial income and outweighs
the dividend eﬀect. Hence, S1
2 is higher for higher trade openness.
Given this comparison between asset holdings for diﬀerent import shares, I can analyze possible
interaction eﬀects between bilateral trade ﬂows and trade openness. An interaction eﬀect would
show up through an inﬂuence of openness on the eﬀect bilateral trade has on stock holdings. For my
calibration, I ﬁnd a small interaction eﬀect. The inﬂuence of bilateral trade ﬂows on the portfolio
share is smaller for higher openness, i.e., S1
2 has a smaller slope for α1
2 + α1
3 = 0 4. The intuitive
explanation is that once a country has a lot of overall trade, the trade with one single country
becomes less important for risk-sharing.
4. Empirical Evidence
4.1. Data and Econometric Speciﬁcation
In this section, I provide empirical evidence on the eﬀects of bilateral and total trade ﬂows on the
bilateral foreign asset position. For this analysis, I use a data-set that breaks international security
holdings down by the residence of the security issuer, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
(CPIS) provided by the IMF. The CPIS reports data on year-end cross-border security holdings,
where security holdings include holdings of equity, long-term and short-term debt securities, i.e.,
claims to a country’s output. In using this broad deﬁnition of portfolio investment, my analysis is
comparable to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Annual data starting in 2001 is available for up to
74 source and 236 destination countries and territories. Although in principle I could employ panel
data methods, the low time-variation (high correlation over time) in bilateral asset holdings leads
me to consider only cross-sections without losing too much sample information. To estimate my
model, I use the 2001 cross-section, which was also used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008),15 and
the 2007 cross-section, which is the latest available year and has the broadest country coverage.16
Speciﬁcally, my econometric analysis is based on the following gravity model:17
log(assetsij) = dj + β1 log(biltradeij) + βZij + γ1 log(tottradei) + γCi + ǫij , (26)
where assetsij is the level of portfolio investment in host country j by source country i18, biltradeij
measures trade between source country i and host country j, tottradei is total trade of source
country i, all three measured in millions of US Dollars, dj is a host country dummy, and ǫij is an
15For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the CPIS data regarding country coverage and asset reporting, see
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
16The data for 2008 is only preliminary.
17For a complete list of data sources and variable deﬁnitions, see appendix B.
18
16error term. I also include a set of bilaterally varying control variables, Zij, and a set of controls for
source country characteristics, Ci. While Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) employ a double ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation with host and source country dummies, I cannot use source country dummies
as they would absorb the eﬀect of total trade.
I follow the literature and specify the dependent variable in natural logarithms.19 In addition,
I exclude source and host countries that mainly act as ﬁnancial oﬀshore centers.20 The reasons
why these countries hold cross-border asset holdings might diﬀer systematically from other source
countries since ﬁnancial oﬀshore centers are mostly intermediaries (see the discussion in Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). Similarly, the motives why source countries hold assets of ﬁnancial oﬀshore
centers might be diﬀerent as well.
Zij consists of variables that have been previously found to inﬂuence bilateral investment patterns.
First, these include the geographical distance and the time-zone diﬀerence between two countries,
which could possibly have a negative impact on information ﬂows and communication.21 Second,
I include dummies for common language, past colonial relationship, and currency unions, which
are measures for cultural and ﬁnancial proximity that could help overcome information barriers.
Furthermore, I include a dummy for the existence of a tax treaty and control for a possible
diversiﬁcation motive by including the correlation between GDP growth rates of source and host
country.
The source country control variables, Ci, include country speciﬁc characteristics that inﬂuence
its propensity to hold outward investments. The factors I control for are the size of the source
country (measured by population), and economic and ﬁnancial development (measured by GDP
per capita and stock market capitalization). Richer countries and those with a better developed
ﬁnancial market might have higher incentives to invest in securities of other countries (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).
4.2. Estimation Results
The ﬁrst two columns of table (2) present OLS estimates for the 2001 cross-section not including
(column 1) and including (column 2) total trade as a regressor, respectively. The results show that
bilateral trade and total trade both have a signiﬁcant positive impact on bilateral asset holdings,
even when controlling for informational frictions and source country characteristics. Once I include
total trade in the regression, the inﬂuence of bilateral trade decreases slightly. The eﬀect of total
trade is similar in magnitude to the eﬀect of bilateral trade. Other signiﬁcant factors are bilateral
distance (with the expected negative inﬂuence), common language and being in a currency union
(both raising bilateral asset holdings). Economic and ﬁnancial development seems to have a positive
19While this forces me to exclude all observations that are equal to zero, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) argue that
this speciﬁcation is justiﬁed on the grounds that the main focus is on variables explaining the speciﬁc magnitude
of investments. Including zero observations would put a higher emphasis on regressors explaining the diﬀerence
between zero and non-zero asset holdings. A way to include zero observations would be to add a small "epsilon"
to the dependent variable before taking logs, i.e., log(assets + ε).
20See appendix C for a list of excluded countries.
21While the negative impact of distance on trade in goods can be justiﬁed by transportation costs, this does not
apply to "weightless" equities. Distance is thus interpreted as a barrier to information ﬂows. The time diﬀerence
between countries hinders communication directly (see Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Portes and Rey, 2005; Stein
and Daude, 2007).
17inﬂuence on a country’s bilateral investment, GDP per capita and stock market capitalization both
have signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients. A country’s population, apart from the role it plays in GDP
per capita, is not signiﬁcant in itself. Including total trade in the regression leads to marginally
smaller coeﬃcients for the regressors that control for source country characteristics.
Using the cross-section for 2007 changes the OLS estimates only slightly, as columns 1 and 2
of table (3) show. However, some diﬀerences are noteworthy. First, there are more observations.
Interestingly, only a small share of the higher amount of non-zero observations are due to the
additional countries reporting to the CPIS in 2007.22 One potential explanation for the higher
number of observations might be a higher worldwide ﬁnancial integration.
Second, the eﬀects of some regressors have become stronger, while others have become smaller.
The coeﬃcient for total trade is slightly smaller than in 2001. The eﬀect of the currency union
is stronger in 2007, which might be driven by the European Monetary Union. The coeﬃcient
for the time zone diﬀerence is now signiﬁcant. However, it is positive and very small, making an
interpretation diﬃcult. The coeﬃcient of per capita GDP is higher, while the one for stock market
capitalization is smaller.
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) point to an endogeneity problem that renders OLS estimates
biased and inconsistent. Not only does trade in goods aﬀect asset holdings, the reverse is also
possible. Therefore, I use instrumental variables to check the robustness of the results. The possibly
endogenous regressors that I instrument are bilateral and total trade, the correlation of GDP
growth rates, GDP per capita, and stock market capitalization. As instruments I use variables
that are known to be correlated with trade: the product of the land area of the two countries, a
common border dummy, a dummy for being in a free-trade-agreement, a dummy for the number of
landlocked countries in the country pair23, and a dummy for a common colonial ruler after 1945.24 I
also use the colonial dummy as an instrument (excluding this dummy as an independent regressor).
Furthermore, I include lagged GDP per capita, lagged stock market capitalization and the lagged
correlation of GDP growth rates in my list of instruments.
Column 3 of table (2) and column 3 of table (3) show the results for the IV estimation. The results
are mostly unchanged in comparison to the OLS estimates. All regressors that were signiﬁcant
before are still signiﬁcant with similarly sized coeﬃcients. One exception applies to the IV results
for 2007. Total trade does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect anymore. Thus, the eﬀect of total trade on
bilateral asset holdings might not be as robust as the eﬀect of bilateral trade. Considering that the
OLS-results show a smaller coeﬃcient for total trade, a possible conclusion might be that the eﬀect
of total trade has decreased with increasing ﬁnancial linkages.
22Countries that report their security holdings for the ﬁrst time after 2001 include Pakistan (2002), Barbados (2003),
Kuwait (2003), Mexico (2003), Gibraltar (2004), India (2004), and Latvia (2006). The number in parentheses is
the ﬁrst year these countries report their data in the CPIS.
23Takes values 0, 1 or 2.
24The dummy takes the value 1, if the two countries were colonies after 1945 and had the same colonial ruler, e.g.,
Singapore and Sri Lanka.
185. Conclusion
Using a three-country stochastic general equilibrium model, I have shown in this paper that bilateral
trade and trade openness both have an independent and positive eﬀect on bilateral cross-country
asset holdings. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt at a uniﬁed framework for these two
eﬀects as the separation of the eﬀects of bilateral trade and trade openness is impossible in a
two-country model.
My calibration experiments provided evidence that bilateral trade ﬂows have a positive impact
on the bilateral foreign asset position. This means that two countries which trade more with each
other also hold higher shares of each others’ equities. The reason is that the equities of the trade
partners provide a better hedge for output risks. Similarly, a higher trade openness leads to higher
bilateral asset holdings. Furthermore, I have identiﬁed interaction eﬀects between the two trade
measures. A higher trade openness dampens the eﬀect bilateral trade ﬂows have on bilateral asset
holdings. My empirical ﬁndings supported the theoretical results. Analyzing the geographically
categorized asset holdings of 74 countries, showed that bilateral and total trade both have a positive
eﬀect on bilateral portfolio holdings. Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of total trade is less robust and
seems to fall over time.
It would be interesting to relax some of the simplifying assumptions in future work. E.g., in a
framework with incomplete markets the correlation and size of endowment shocks would inﬂuence
the asset portfolios.
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21A. Derivation of Consumption and Terms-of-Trade Responses to
Endowment Shocks
In this appendix, I derive the responses of consumption shares and the terms-of-trade to endowment
shocks. The model is linearized around a symmetric equilibrium, where endowments and prices are
equal and trade is balanced. ˆ x denotes percentage deviations from the symmetric equilibrium ¯ x.








































j for j = 1,2,3  (28)
If 1
θ = ρ, these equations become ˆ c1
j = ˆ c2
j and ˆ c1
j = ˆ c3
j.
Using the deﬁnition  i
j ≡ ci
j/Yj, the linearized risk sharing conditions, and the resource constraints
(equation (14)), I can show that endowment shocks aﬀect consumption shares  1




1 = Σ1ˆ Y1 + Σ2ˆ Y2 + Σ3ˆ Y3, (29)
ˆ  2
2 = Ψ1ˆ Y1 + Ψ2ˆ Y2 + Ψ3ˆ Y3, (30)
where Σi and Ψi are functions of the structural parameters θ, ρ and α
j
i. For all other consumption







j are combinations of ¯  i
js.25 The
signs of Σi and Ψi are driven by the relationship between ρ and θ (see the discussion in the main
text), such that for θ = 1
ρ consumption shares remain constant, i.e. Σi = Ψi = 0, and for θ < 1
ρ
consumption shares in country i increase for a positive endowment shock in country i, while they
fall for a positive endowment shock in one of the other countries.
In a second step, I substitute the consumption share responses in the linearized equations for
relative prices, (21) and (22). The relative price responses can then be summarized in the following
way:
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22assumption ¯  i
j = αi




















































that it holds for arbitrary realizations of ˆ Y1, ˆ Y2, ˆ Y3, which yields equations (23)-(25) in the main
text.
B. Data: Deﬁnitions and Sources
• Bilateral Portfolio Asset Holdings: Portfolio investment assets (equity securities, long-
term and short-term debt securities) held by source country residents and issued by destination
country residents. Asset holdings are end of 2001 (2007) holdings measured in millions of
current US dollars. Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
• Bilateral Trade: Sum of exports and imports between source and host country. Annual
data averaged over the period 1997-2001 and 1997-2007, respectively, in millions of current
US dollars. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
• Total Trade: Sum of exports and imports of the source country for a given year. Annual
data averaged over the period 1997-2001 and 1997-2007, respectively, in millions of current
US dollars. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
• Distance: Great-circle distance in miles between the approximate geographic centers of source
and host country taken from the CIA "World Factbook" (https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/index.html). Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004); Sub-
ramanian and Wei (2007).
• Common Language Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if source and host country have
the same language. Constructed using country-speciﬁc information from the CIA "World
Factbook". Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004); Subramanian and Wei (2007).
• Colony Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if source and host country have ever been in a
colonial relationship. Constructed using country-speciﬁc information from the CIA "World
Factbook". Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004); Subramanian and Wei (2007).
• Time Diﬀerence: Absolute value of the time diﬀerence between source and host country
(ranging from 0 to 12). Source: http://timeanddate.com.
• Tax Treaty Dummy: Dummy variable, that is 1 if the source and host country have a
double taxation treaty prior to 1999. Source: Treaty data from http://www.unctad.org.
• Population: Source country population in thousands. Source: World Development Indicators,
World Bank.
• GDP per capita: Source country GDP in current US dollars per capita. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank.
23• GDP growth rate correlation: Correlation between the annual nominal GDP growth
rates of source country i and host country j using growth rates from 1981-2000. For the
IV-estimation I use the correlation between growth rates for the period 1981-1990 as the
lagged variable. Source: Calculations based on World Development Indicators, World Bank.
• Stock Market Capitalization: Market capitalization of the companies, listed on the source
country’s stock exchange in millions of current US dollars. Source: World Development
Indicators, World Bank.
C. List of Excluded Oﬀshore Financial Centers
The following list contains the countries and territories I have excluded in my empirical analysis.
These countries and territories are classiﬁed as oﬀshore ﬁnancial centers by the IMF (see Zorome,
2007). If a country or territory is an oﬀshore ﬁnancial center according to the IMF, but was not
excluded by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), I follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and do not
exclude that country either.
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar,
Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Palau,
Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks
and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.
24Table 2: Regression Results for 2001
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets)
Estimation method OLS OLS IV
Log bilateral trade 0.46 0.36 0.28
(8.95)*** (6.51)*** (1.69)*
Log total trade 0.42 0.75
(5.02)*** (4.04)***
Log distance -0.41 -0.45 -0.48
(-4.00)*** (-4.41)*** (-2.58)***
Common language dummy 0.76 0.84 0.94
(6.56)*** (7.32)*** (6.88)***
Colony dummy 0.23 0.29
(1.19) (1.49)
Currency union dummy 1.25 1.20 1.12
(8.44)*** (8.25)*** (7.22)***
Time zone diﬀerence 0.03 0.02 0.01
(1.26) (0.71) (0.43)
Correlation in growth rates 0.15 0.15 0.30
(1.00) (1.01) (1.21)
Tax treaty dummy -0.02 -0.07 -0.11
(-0.19) (-0.77) (-1.24)
Log GDP per capita 1.35 1.14 0.88
(13.83)*** (10.82)*** (7.40)***
Log market capitalization 0.28 0.23 0.25
(4.82)*** (3.97)*** (3.36)***
Log Population 0.15 -0.00 -0.19
(2.06)** (-0.05) (-2.09)**
N 1725 1725 1725
Adjusted ¯ R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
Note: Asset holdings are end of 2001 holdings measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Regressions include ﬁxed host
country eﬀects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗,
∗∗ and
∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
25Table 3: Regression Results for 2007
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Log(assets) Log(assets) Log(assets)
Estimation method OLS OLS IV
Log bilateral trade 0.49 0.43 0.69
(10.69)*** (8.27)*** (4.68)***
Log total trade 0.23 -0.03
(2.98)*** (-0.18)
Log distance -0.41 -0.44 -0.21
(-4.72)*** (-5.01)*** (-1.29)
Common language dummy 0.88 0.91 0.73
(8.08)*** (8.26)*** (5.34)***
Colony dummy -0.09 -0.02
(-0.43) (-0.10)
Currency union dummy 1.47 1.43 1.50
(10.46)*** (10.19)*** (9.68)***
Time zone diﬀerence 0.06 0.05 0.06
(3.12)*** (2.72)*** (2.99)***
Correlation in growth rates 0.06 0.07 0.05
(0.48) (0.55) (0.23)
Tax treaty dummy 0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.22) (0.10) (-0.01)
Log GDP per capita 1.50 1.37 1.34
(19.25)*** (15.85)*** (13.56)***
Log market capitalization 0.14 0.11 0.16
(3.47)*** (2.63)*** (3.40)***
Log Population 0.15 0.07 -0.02
(2.59)*** (1.10) (-0.27)
N 2417 2417 2417
Adjusted ¯ R2 0.74 0.74 0.74
Note: Asset holdings are end of 2007 holdings measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Regressions include ﬁxed host
country eﬀects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗,
∗∗ and
∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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